Files
gouki f09c0f6e4b fix(review): 处理全量审查剩余项(M4-M8/M11/M12 + 21 条 low)
后端
- asset_service: delete_asset 先清 subdomains/site_certs 子表(SQLite 不强制
  FK 且 assets.id 无 AUTOINCREMENT,删最大 id 后新建会复用 rowid 导致孤儿误挂);
  metrics.db 清理改 best-effort,不再让已成功的删除返回 500
- provider_service: slug 唯一约束竞态补 IntegrityError 兜底(与 account_service 一致)
- account_service/sync_service: raise HTTPException 补 from e,保留原始异常链
- sync_service: 删死代码 _load_config;新增 BalanceUnsupported,平台无余额接口时
  计入 skipped 而不是静默当作失败;到期日写库前归一
- ai: 删掉 OpenAI 早已下线的 billing 余额接口实现,能力探测如实报「不支持」
- adapters/base: _overridden 改走 MRO,中间层基类实现的能力不再被误判为未实现
- core/timeutils: 删死代码 utcnow_iso(注释声称 Z 后缀,实际输出 +00:00)
- main: lifespan 退出时 await 被 cancel 的清理任务,避免 pending task 被销毁
- ssl_service: 写 site_certs/subdomains 前校验 asset_id 存在,杜绝悬空引用;
  到期阈值贯穿 _judge_status/_apply_probe/check_one/check_all_site_certs
- routers/credentials、accounts: 明文密码 GET 补 Cache-Control: no-store
- routers/stats: /stats/expiring 的 Query 描述与实际语义对齐(不设下界,含已过期)

Agent
- collector: 解析 sshd_config 的 Include(含 sshd_config.d/*.conf,按 sshd 语义
  「首次出现的值生效」),未显式配置的关键字按编译默认值判定,消除假 pass;
  防火墙检测改用 iptables -S 统计 -A 规则行并读 INPUT 策略(-L -n 恒有链头输出)
- reporter: 4xx(除 429)不再重试直接退出,429 优先按 Retry-After 退避

安全与部署
- core/security: require_agent_key 改为对外 fail-closed——tailnet/本机放行,
  外部来源未配 AGENT_KEY 时一律 401(此前全放行,而服务默认监听 0.0.0.0,
  公网上任何人可伪造监控指标与安全检查结果)
- main: 启动时把「未配 API_KEY/AGENT_KEY 则外部来源不可用」打进日志
- run.sh: HOST/PORT 可用环境变量覆盖,并说明默认 0.0.0.0 的权衡
- deploy/setup.sh: 新装时自动生成随机 API_KEY/AGENT_KEY 并提示同步到各 VPS;
  注册 vps-cert-check.timer
- deploy/vps-cert-check.{service,timer}: 新增每日 09:30 的站点证书到期探测
  (此前 check_site_certs.py 没有任何 unit,证书提醒不会自动跑)
- deploy/update.sh: sync_units 对 timer 用 enable --now(新增 timer 只 restart
  不会建开机自启软链),主服务 unit 变更后额外 restart;pip 安装失败不再被吞
- scripts/check_site_certs.py: threshold 参数真正生效并打印
- scripts/make_migration_bundle.py: 缺 assets.db 直接 abort;umask 077 + chmod 600
  (包内含 .env 的 MASTER_KEY 与 escrow,不能默认 644 落在 /tmp)
- scripts/restore_migration_bundle.py: 校验之外补必备文件预检,缺文件在触碰
  目标机状态之前就 abort

前端
- store: 拆分列表口径 assets 与统计口径 allAssets(无筛选时同源,不重复请求);
  删除已无消费者的 expiring/loadExpiring(每次 loadAll 白发一个请求)
- dashboard/monitor/providers/subscriptions/modals: 统计与计数改用 allAssets,
  资产页的筛选(含统计卡片点击跳转带的筛选)不再让其他视图的数字缩水
- modals: 账号同步后补 loadOverview;settings: 导入后改 loadAll
- api: countdownText 支持 unit/empty 选项,monitor/domains 各自的实现改为委托,
  assets/domains/subscriptions 的到期列不再直出「(-3天)」
- servers: cpu/mem/disk 百分比统一判空,采样缺项不再渲染「null%」
- assets: 同步 AI 余额的结果提示区分 skipped(平台无余额接口)与 failed
- modals: 修正凭据库头注释——2FA 动态码是选填 + 可事后补验,与实现一致

测试
- 新增 tests/test_agent_collector.py(8 条)、tests/test_security.py(11 条)
- 全量 113 passed;改动 JS 均通过 node --check,deploy 脚本通过 bash -n
- 浏览器实测:筛选态下总览/监控中心/平台页/付费资产的统计仍为全量口径,
  到期文案与 null 百分比渲染正确,console 零报错
2026-09-23 10:15:52 +00:00

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"""API Key / Agent Key 鉴权边界测试
锁死两条不可回退的行为:
1. 可信来源判定:tailnet(100.64.0.0/10)与本机回环放行;仅当请求确实来自回环时
才信任 X-Forwarded-For(tailscale serve 转发场景),防止外部直连伪造 XFF 绕过。
2. 未配置密钥时对外部来源必须**拒绝**(fail-closed)。Agent 上报此前是「未配 key
就全放行」,而服务默认监听 0.0.0.0,公网上任何人都能伪造监控数据上报。
运行:.venv/bin/pytest tests/test_security.py -v
"""
import asyncio
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException
from starlette.requests import Request
from app.core.config import settings
from app.core.security import require_agent_key, require_api_key
TAILNET_IP = "100.89.0.5"
PUBLIC_IP = "203.0.113.7"
def _request(client_ip: str = PUBLIC_IP, headers: dict = None) -> Request:
"""构造最小 Request:只需 client 与 headers 两个属性"""
scope = {
"type": "http",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/agent/report",
"client": (client_ip, 40000) if client_ip else None,
"headers": [
(k.lower().encode(), v.encode()) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()
],
}
return Request(scope)
def _run(coro):
return asyncio.run(coro)
def _assert_401(coro):
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
_run(coro)
assert exc.value.status_code == 401
return exc.value
# ----------------------------- 可信来源放行 ----------------------------- #
def test_tailnet_source_allowed_without_key(monkeypatch):
"""走 tailnet IP 上报的 Agent 不受密钥缺失影响"""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "AGENT_KEY", "")
_run(require_agent_key(_request(TAILNET_IP), None)) # 不抛异常即通过
def test_loopback_source_allowed_without_key(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "API_KEY", "")
_run(require_api_key(_request("127.0.0.1"), None))
def test_loopback_xff_tailnet_allowed(monkeypatch):
"""tailscale serve 转发:peer 是回环、真实来源在 XFF 里且属于 tailnet"""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "API_KEY", "")
req = _request("127.0.0.1", {"X-Forwarded-For": TAILNET_IP})
_run(require_api_key(req, None))
def test_xff_from_public_source_is_ignored(monkeypatch):
"""外部直连时伪造 XFF 不能绕过鉴权(只有回环来源的 XFF 才可信)"""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "API_KEY", "secret")
req = _request(PUBLIC_IP, {"X-Forwarded-For": TAILNET_IP})
exc = _assert_401(require_api_key(req, None))
assert "API Key" in exc.detail
def test_loopback_xff_public_still_requires_key(monkeypatch):
"""回环转发但真实来源是公网 IP(funnel 之外的代理场景)→ 仍需 key"""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "API_KEY", "")
req = _request("127.0.0.1", {"X-Forwarded-For": PUBLIC_IP})
_assert_401(require_api_key(req, None))
def test_funnel_request_forces_key_even_from_tailnet_ip(monkeypatch):
"""funnel 公网流量强制校验,即使来源 IP 恰在 tailnet 网段(双保险)"""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "AGENT_KEY", "")
req = _request(TAILNET_IP, {"Tailscale-Funnel-Request": "?1"})
_assert_401(require_agent_key(req, None))
# ----------------------------- 外部来源 fail-closed ----------------------------- #
def test_agent_key_unset_rejects_external(monkeypatch):
"""未配 AGENT_KEY 时,外部来源必须 401(此前是全放行)"""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "AGENT_KEY", "")
exc = _assert_401(require_agent_key(_request(PUBLIC_IP), None))
assert "AGENT_KEY" in exc.detail
def test_api_key_unset_rejects_external(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "API_KEY", "")
_assert_401(require_api_key(_request(PUBLIC_IP), None))
def test_agent_key_valid_and_invalid(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "AGENT_KEY", "sekret")
_run(require_agent_key(_request(PUBLIC_IP), "sekret")) # 正确 key 放行
_assert_401(require_agent_key(_request(PUBLIC_IP), "wrong"))
_assert_401(require_agent_key(_request(PUBLIC_IP), None))
def test_api_key_valid_and_invalid(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "API_KEY", "sekret")
_run(require_api_key(_request(PUBLIC_IP), "sekret"))
_assert_401(require_api_key(_request(PUBLIC_IP), "wrong"))
def test_unknown_client_is_not_trusted(monkeypatch):
"""拿不到 client(如某些代理场景)时按不可信处理,不能默认放行"""
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "AGENT_KEY", "")
_assert_401(require_agent_key(_request(None), None))